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Sanctity of Life 
Father Jack Healy, O.Carm. 
We may ask what value the notion of "sanctity of life" has when, in 
support of their positions, both proponents and opponents of suicide and 
voluntary euthanasia appeal to it. For example, Glanville Williams, a long 
time advocate in England of voluntary euthanasia and abortion, 
introduced his ideas to the American public in 1957 with a book entitled 
The Sanctity of Life and the Criminal Law. I Williams sees no 
incompatability between the sanctity of life principle and the practices he 
advocates. Yet Albert Schweitzer, having concluded on the basis of his 
African missionary work that human life was inviolable and sacred, 
formulated a view ofthe sanctity oflife (Ehrfurcht vor dem Leben! which 
could in no way admit what Williams proposes. 
We may ask, furthermore , what value the sanctity of life notion has 
when moralists differ so fundamentally as to its serviceability in ethical 
discourse . Marvin Kohl, the Fredonia State philosopher and advocate of 
"beneficent euthanasia," says of the notion, 
It is chameleon-like, changing its colours according to the moral theory it rests 
upon. It is almost as if a family of related but differing principles were hidden 
under the rubric of the SLP [Sanctity-of-Life Principle] in order to give the 
impression of moral consensus.) 
Yet Daniel Callahan, the Roman Catholic moralist, claims to the contrary 
that the notion of the sanctity of life does , in fact, provide "some minimal 
degree of moral consensus," that 
On the basis of this principle, moral rules have been framed , human rights 
claimed and defended , and cultural, political, a nd social priorities established.· 
Whatever questions may be raised as to its value or usefulness, the 
notion of the sanctity of life continues nonetheless to function as an 
indemonstrable truth in the moral realm. Were this not the case, Peter 
Singer, on the one hand , would not feel compelled to attack it so frontally 
as he does in his article, "Unsanctifying Human Life,"5 and, the Vatican, 
on the other hand, would not be so confident to assert in its "Declaration 
on Euthanasia" that "Most people regard life as something sacred ."6 Thus, 
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we must more thoroughly investigate the notion and its foundation in 
Western thought. 
On the surface, the notion, especially in the field of bioethics, is 
synonymous with "respect for life," and "the inviolability of life." With its 
assumption that human life is "precious," "holy," "sacred," "worthy of 
reverence," the notion asserts that life is "of irreducible value" or "of 
absolute value."7 Such connotations are highly evocative, touching, 
perhaps, a sentiment or intuition we all share as human beings. Yet 
however connotated, the notion that life is sacred still needs to be further 
specified. 
The Four Propositions 
In support of his claim that the notion is "chameleon-like," Marvin Kohl 
has spelled out its shades of meaning in four propositions. 8 The 
propositions are, in fact, material norms, each of which offers a different 
reason for the negative injunction "One ought never to kill an innocent 
human being." 
The first proposition is the one universally endorsed by the Judaeo-
Christian tradition: "One ought never to kill an innocent human being 
because in some religious or protoreligious sense life is sacred." Within this 
religious context the sanctity oflife principle carries the belief in a Creator 
God who alone exercises absolute dominion over man. The principle thus 
has religious meaning. The second and third propositions forbidding the 
killing of the innocent claim respectively that "such an action would be 
unjust" and that "such an action may (or must) lead to undesirable 
consequences." Framed within these contexts,'the sanctity oflife principle 
seeks to guarantee what is fair and due to persons and to forestall negative 
consequences for them and for society at large. The principle thus has legal 
and utilitarian meanings. Finally, the last proposition is axiomatic in that 
"The sentence 'One ought never to kill an innocent human being' expresses 
an ultimate moral principle." Stated thus , the sanctity of life principle 
claims to be self-validating, admitting no reduction or appeal to other rules 
or principles. Needing no other arbiter, the principle thus has in itself 
ultimate meaning. 
It is, of course, to refute the sanctity of life principle that Kohl lays bare 
its religious, legal, consequentialist and axiomatic interpretations. In so 
doing, he has alerted us to the fact that the notion of life's sanctity admits 
also of non-religious understandings and that underlying each of these 
understandings is a different "moral theory." Of interest to us is the fact 
that these theories also find their place in Catholic morality and fan out 
into two broad approaches to moral reasoning. These approaches have 
been labelled as either "consequentialist" or "deontologist" and, in fact, 
underlie Kohl's two last propositions mentioned above. 
Roman Catholics in the United States, although unfamiliar with the 
labels, may recognize the names of the moralists in each camp: Daniel 
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MaGuire, Charles Curran, Richard McCormick among the consequen-
tialists and Germain Grisez, Joseph Boyle, William May among the 
deontologists. Naturally, the moral approaches of these men extend 
beyond the Iife / death issues of abortion, suicide and euthanasia. (As we 
know, the Vatican censured Fr. Curran for his views on sex and 
contraception) . Both the consequentialists and the deontologists endorse 
the religious meaning of the sanctity of life principle although their 
disparate approaches lead them to draw different conclusions with regard 
to life issues . 
Richard Gula in the Paulist Press series on topical issues, " What are they 
saying about ... 1", sketches in broad strokes the difference between 
consequentialist and deontological thinking.9 We need only touch on the 
matter here . Whereas the deontologists claim that absolute norms exist 
and that certain human actions are intrinsice malum. the consequentialists 
deny this claim, admit moral exceptions yet concede the existence of what 
they call "virtually exceptionless norms." Whereas the strategy of the 
deontologists to solve ethical problems is to invoke rules or norms, that of 
the consequentialists is to use "proportionate reason" which weighs the 
value or good attendant on one's action against its disvalue and (premoral) 
evil. The point to be made here is that the consequentialists, unlike their 
counterparts, acknowledge moral exceptions even in the realm of life 
issues. Thus, by applying the calculus of proportionate reason, MaGuire 
and Curran permit, in circumscribed cases involving values commensurate 
with life itself, the direct killing of the innocent.1O 
Stated thus , the conclusion is daunting that directly killing the innocent 
is permissible under certain circumstances. A deontologist finds the 
conclusion unacceptable despite the fact that it may logically follow from 
the position taken in the on-going debate about the principle of "double 
effect," and the distinction between ordinary/ extraordinary means and 
between acts of omission / commission. For the norm-bound deontologist, 
no set of circumstances ever permits directly dispatching the terminally ill 
or dying, the unborn, or even oneself." We mention this fact not to make a 
case for the strength of deontology over consequentialism. Our 
characterization of their positions has been too superficial to permit that. 
Rather we intend only to point out the paradox within Catholic morality 
that two groups divergent in their strategies and conclusions concerning 
life-issues, nevertheless presuppose as a religious principle the sanctity of 
life. 
Sacredness in History 
In the West , the notion that life is sacred owes its origin to the Judaeo-
Christian revelation . That life is holy per se because it stems from God is an 
idea which has permeated all the social and legal structures of western 
society. Albin Eser has done us a service by tracing the idea within the 
German penal code which , dating back to the Holy Roman Empire, 
prevailed throughout continental Europe till the modern age. 12 Called 
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the Carolina after Emperor Charles V, the code crystallized old Roman 
law, Germanic customs and ecclesiastical canOR law. The Code 
exemplifies a definitive stage in spiritualizing the notion of human life by 
treating for the first time every individual as a person with equal dignity 
irrespective of age, physical/ mental qualities, sex or social status. 
Until the promulgation of the Carolina, Roman law and Germanic 
tribal law denied full humanity to one who was not homo liber and thus, 
for example, regarded the killing of a slave not as murder but as the 
destruction of property. While it considered abortion an indency, Roman 
law came around to punishing it only for reasons of demographics and out 
of consideration for a father's right to legitimate heir. In contrast to 
Roman law, however, Germanic law in the middle ages reflected more 
aptly the Christian mentality with regard to the unborn. At the base of this 
mentality lay the Christian notion of "soul" which in effect spirtitualized 
man's essence. In this view, 
the protection of life naturally cannot merely be centered in the state of the body 
or in the body's utility to society. The anima, or soul, also must be respected. 13 
As a result, the courts, invoking Aristotle and the Mosaic law, recognized 
the animation of the fetus and accorded it personhood forty days after its 
conception. Unborn life was henceforth institutionally protected with 
penalties imposed as severe as decapitation for committing abortion. The 
courts , however, did not regard a severely deformed baby, a so-called 
"monster," as possessing a soul and quite consistently, though 
unfortunately, permitted its destruction. 
As to the wilful ending of life by suicide and euthanasia, the Carolina 
penalized only criminals who attempted through suicide to escape 
punishment. The state confiscated their property and deprived their heirs 
of an inheritance. With regard to suicide for other reasons , (e .g. disease, 
depression) the Carolina is silent as it is with regard to the practice of 
euthanasia . Nevertheless, despite the silence, the presumption of the 
Carolina is in favor of protecting all human life as we may garner from the 
fact that various states using the Carolina enacted laws prohibiting suicide 
and complicity in it. 
The telling point for us is Eser's analysis ofthe Carolina Code is that one 
of the most influential penal codes in human history enshrined the sanctity 
of life principle. Furthermore, the code presupposed as the foundation of 
the principle that man possessed a spiritual soul enabling him to 
participate in divine life and enter the sphere of the holy. Informed as it was 
by the ludaeo-Christian revelation , the code, therefore, incorporated 
sanctity of life as a religious principle. Even with the rise of the modern 
state and the replacement of the code, western law retained the principle as 
axiomatic while never losing its religious sense. 
Attack on the Principle 
In this post-modern era, however, the legalization of abortion has 
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seriously undermined the retention of the principle. Moreover, the 
worldwide euthanasia movement l4 continues to assail the principle with 
strict consequentialist or utilitarian arguments championing the in-
dividual's right to so-called death with dignity. Touting such a right, for 
example, is Joseph Fletcher, the situation ethicist, who is already bidding 
good riddance to the sanctity of life principle according to its religious 
meaning. In his words, 
This sacralistic theology, with its opposition to birth control and abortion and 
euthanasia, has at last run full tilt into humanistic medicine with its ethic of 
responsibility - in genetics, reproduction, contraception, prevention of defective 
births and unwanted children, as well as responsibility for the termination of 
subhuman life in posthuman beings. IS 
Should the proponents of the right to die succeed in decriminalizing 
active / voluntary euthanasia or medically assisted suicide, they will have, 
in consort with the pro-abortionists, deinstitutionalized the sanctity oflife 
principle in society. 16 
In the battle over the religious sense of life's holiness the stakes are high 
because society's conscience is profoundly affected by the policies of our 
legal and medical institutions. We must make more precise what hangs in 
the balance with the retention or loss ofthe principle oflife's sacrality. Our 
considerations of the principle will be, therefore, along theoretical lines, 
leaving aside the practical ramifications which result when the principle is, 
for example, affirmed, as in the hospice care movement or denied, as in the 
eugenic policy of the Nazis . 
Undergirding the religious notion of sanctity of life is the belief that man 
enjoys a relation which transcends any other relation he has in the world of 
creatures and institutions. As to the two terms of this transcendent 
relation, ancient Greek philosophy, on the one hand, contributed the 
notion of an "immortal soul," while Hebrew thought, on the other, that of 
a Creator-God. Thus, in virtue of possessing an immortal soul man stood 
in relation to God as cause and final end. Whereas the Greeks recognized 
as agios a realm, usually a sanctuary, which was "inaccessible" to mortals, 
the Hebrews acknowledged as kodesh a state of being which was wholly 
"separate" from the profane world. Moreover, for the Hebrews, kodesh 
expressed God's being and perfection and later by extension the 
relationship of God and his chosen people. It fell to the first Christians to 
personalize the Hebrew notion so that the individual himself was holy in 
virtue of God's Holy Spirit. 17 
Thus , to speak, in light of Greek and Hebrew thought, of the holiness or 
sanctity of life is to posit between God and man a relation which by 
definition is separate from and inaccessible to any other creaturely relation 
a person enjoys. By qualifying human life as holy, we ascribe to it a divine 
attribute which brings man within the sphere of God's own state of being. 
Parenthetically, we may recall that in his famous study, The Idea of the 
Holy, Rudolf Otto designated this sphere as the numen or mysterium 
tremendum, a reality recognized universally by all peoples. 18 In all times 
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and places mankind, in its myths and rituals, has known association with 
the "Holy."19 But western man has dared the assertion that in virtue of his 
association with God, human life itself is inherently sacred. In short, 
human life participates in the separate, inaccessible mystery of God's own 
being. 
Thus, as God's being admits of no manipulation and control, so too 
man's being. However fallible , weak, and prone to dissolution , human 
being remains "separate" in itself from outside forces. Were this not so, it 
would not be holy and inviolable. Human life, therefore, is not only from 
God, it is also a/God in that it shares in his otherness. For this reason, the 
French Bishops' Commission on the Family rightly states in its declaration 
on abortion, 
A human life does not belong to others, not to the parents who conceive it , not to 
the state. It does not belong even to itself absolutely; it belongs to God . ... 20 
In this succinct statement we find articulated the essence of the sanctity 
of life principle. Between God and each person the relation is so unique 
and profound that it transcends even that which a person has with himself. 
Hence, a person's life lies at no one's disposal, not even his own.' 
The declaration of the French Bishops' Commission deserves to be read 
for the lucidity of the argument against abortion and , indeed , any wilful 
killing, like suicide. At the heart of the argument lies a sustained analysis of 
man's capacity for relations . Thus, for example, the human embryo, 
possessing its genetic patrimony from the moment of conception, 
immediately enters a web of relations. The embryo stands in relation to its 
origin which is the procreative act of its parents, with its mother during 
gestation and with the end to which the embryo is ordained, namely, birth 
and life with its parents. Says the declaration, "the embryo belongs from 
the depths of its being to the world of human relations."21 Being human in 
virtue of the human act which engendered it , the embryo has, therefore, the 
capacity to enter into reciprocal relations. yet, as the declaration makes 
clear, there remains at the base of this network ("reseau") of human 
relations, the one condition which makes them possible: the transcendent 
relation the soul has with God. 
Properties of Relations 
The phrase "transcendent relation" needs to be explained since it made 
its way into western philosophy only in the middle ages. Till then 
philosophers adhered to Aristotle who, in classifying being into ten 
categories, defined the category of "relation" in terms of physical, 
quantifiable being. Of the ten categories, "substance" - we would say 
today "subject" - was the first and referred to any being which existed by 
itself and supported properties which otherwise would have no real 
existence. Such properties comprise the remaining nine categories such as 
quantity, quality, location, time, relation, etc. As is obvious, these 
categories, also called "predicamentals," answer to questions about the 
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subject: "how much does the subject weigh?" (quantity), "what type of thing 
is the subject?" (quality), "where is the subject found?" (location), "when did 
the subject exist?" (time). Among these predicamentals is one which 
answers to the question , "how does the subject stand in reference to 
another?" The predicamental in question is, of course, "relation." 
In virtue of any or all of the predicamentals, we can view one subject in 
relation to another so as to categorize or make a comparison. For example, 
we can view oranges relative to each other or other fruits on the basis of 
weight (quantity) or place of origin (location) or sweetness (quality). 
Weight, place and sweetness are the foundation for the real relation of 
similarity among oranges and other fruits. Yet, Aristotle's categories 
pertained to corporeal realities and were thus extrinsic. They could not 
easily accommodate relations of a different sort, like that established by 
"desire" or "intention."22 What similarity is there between a person's desire 
and a car? between his intention and canoeing? How does one characterize 
this relation? Desire and intention are operations of the soul; they are 
spiritual and intrinsic realities that go beyond their immediate object. Their 
aim is "satisfaction" or "happiness," realities of a psychic or spiritual nature. 
Relations of this sort, therefore, exceed the extrinsic and corporeal. They 
are not predicamental. Recognizing their reality, the philosophers of the 
middle ages called them "transcendent." 
To speak of the soul's transcendent relation with God is to raise 
immediately questions about the similarity between the "soul" and "God" 
and the foundation in reality which permits their mutual reference. The 
ancient Greeks had unwittingly supplied part of the answer by positing an 
immortal soul, while the Hebrews, a God who was pure spirit. Both the soul 
and God are, of course, spiritual beings. Herein lies the similarity and the 
real foundation for a relation. In the middle ages, St. Thomas gave more 
specific treatment to the foundation in man for this relation23 and regarded 
man as innately capax Dei (capable of God). The notion of man inherently 
structured for a personal relation with God provides the cornerstone of the 
contemporary religious philosophy of Karl Rahner. 24 In any case, the idea 
of man-and-God in relation has informed western thought for thousands of 
years as we see in the ancient Greeks and Hebrews, the medieval 
philosophers, the Renaissance "Carolina," and today's religious 
anthropology. 
Relation of God and Man 
Thus, western thought has consistently maintained that the relation 
between God and man exceeds the material order with its mundane 
institutions and technologies. Moreover, western thought has char-
acterized that relation in terms meant to convey its transcendence and 
otherness. Thus, the relation is "holy," "sacred," "inviolable," "absolute." 
Strictly speaking then, it is in virtue of his primordial relation with God 
that man's life is holy and inviolable. Understood religiously, the 
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sanctity of life principle acknowledges that transcendent relation. 
It is precisely that relation, however, which is under seige by those who 
would eliminate from the legal and medical professions the sanctity of life 
principle. With the elimination of a transcendent reference, no prior and 
absolute claim need inform the thinking and / or treatment of the patient. 
Neither the patient nor the doctor need defer to a Creator-God. For the 
patient and the institutions involved in his fate, the playing field is 
completely levelled. That is, the common ground they share is reduced to a 
relation of shifting, if not competing, rights and obligations. 
Little wonder that in today's world the arguments over life-issues have 
been framed primarily in terms of "rights:" the right to life, the right to 
choose, the right to die, reproductive rights, etc. But such arguments run 
counter to the long philosophic, religious and judicial tradition which until 
today has molded western thinking. Thanks to that tradition in which the 
principle of life's sanctity was paramount, the attitude prevailed in society 
that life was a "gift." The erosion today of this attitude goes, of course, 
hand-in-glove with the dislodging ofthe sanctity of life principle from our 
institutions, like our penal and medical institutions. 
Should they prevail, those who champion the rights to abortion, to 
mercy-killing, to suicide will remove from society's conscience the 
awareness that every human being is other than and distinct from the 
human relations and institutions which define him; that human life is 
unassailable because it shares God's mystery; that the transcendent 
relation between the person and God admits no human intrusion, not even 
that of the person himself. Should the champions of the right to kill 
succeed in their agenda, they will snatch from society not only the bodies of 
its unborn, its handicapped, its comatose, its despondent, its criminal, its 
dying, but also its very soul. 
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